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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ADA JONES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DAVID BALDWIN and GLORIA BALDWIN, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 960423-CA 
JL SUGGESTION OF PEATB 
In Ms. Jones1 brief in this matter she suggested at footnote 
1 that David Baldwin had passed away subsequent to the filing of 
his initial brief. Attached hereto is a copy of Mr. Baldwin's 
death certificate. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
38(a) "If the deceased party has no representative, any party may 
suggest the death on the record and proceedings shall then be had 
as the court may direct." Mrs. Baldwin has informed the 
undersigned counsel of record that no personal representative for 
probate purposes has been appointed for her late husband because 
of the de minimus nature of his estate. Defendants!/Appellantsf 
counsel suggests that the ends of justice in this case would be 
best served by allowing the appeal to proceed unhindered by the 
death of Mr. Baldwin. 
XL ARGUMENT 
Counsel for Ms. Jones has attempted to elevate the standard 
of review from the "erroneous" standard, applicable to errors of 
law as set forth in Baldwins1 initial brief, to an "abuse of 
discretion" standard. Ms. Jones has sought to do this by arguing 
everything from the context of the relief ordered by the lower 
court. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) : 
In cases of equity this court is authorized to 
exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both 
questions of law and questions of fact. While we have 
recognized the trial court's advantageous position in 
relation to questions of fact, when the trial court has 
based its rulings upon a misunderstanding and 
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would 
have produced a different result, the party adversely 
affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a 
proper adjudication under correct principles of law.1 
Ms. Jones has spent some effort in arguing that the lower 
court had the power to reverse the initial decision granting 
summary judgment to the Baldwins. There is no argument on that 
point. The thrust of Baldwins1 argument related to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment is not that the court could not change its 
mind, but that the initial decision was correct and the 
subsequent reversal was incorrect as a matter of law. As is 
stated in the prior brief, Judge Tibbsf decision on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment was wrong as a matter of law and all the 
subsequent determinations by the lower court depended upon that 
1
 See also Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1979) 
2 
mistake of law and were therefore themselves erroneous and 
subject to reversal. 
In other words, the stratagem of asking for equitable relief 
is not the shield for errors of law that Plaintiff urges. As is 
discussed in Baldwins' initial brief, the lower court's 
determination to grant an equitable remedy is founded exclusively 
upon errors of law. 
Plaintiff's next mis-statement of the issues and arguments 
relates to the trial court's refusal of evidence and even a 
proffers of the Defendants the Baldwins. Ms. Jones cites 
numerous cases for the proposition that the intent of the parties 
is to be ascertained from within the four corners of the 
documents if that is possible, if not, the secondary source of 
intention is from contemporaneous documents which are part of the 
same transaction, and only if the first two fail utterly is 
extrinsic or parol evidence admitted to prove intentions of the 
parties. That is a correct principle of law. In Utah Valley-
Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981) at page 1061 the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The basic rule of contract interpretation is that 
the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the 
content of the instrument itself, the rationale for 
the rule being to preserve the sanctity of 
written instruments. Each contract provision is 
to be considered in relation to all of the 
others, with the view toward giving effect to 
all and ignoring none. It is only when an 
ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by 
an objective and reasonable interpretation of 
the contract as a whole that resort may be had 
to the use of extrinsic evidence. Applying the 
foregoing legal principles to the case at hand we deem 
the trial judge to have erred in permitting the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence. (Citations 
omitted, emphasis added.) 
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Baldwins1 thrust with respect to the lower court's rulings 
on evidence is not to assert that extrinsic evidence should have 
been admitted. On the contrary, the lower court determine to do 
that in its erroneous final ruling on summary judgment. 
Virtually the entirety of Plaintiff's case consisted of extrinsic 
parol evidence. Even though the courtfs determination to allow 
parol evidence was in error, it is grossly inappropriate to allow 
extrinsic evidence from only one party, in this case the 
Plaintiff, if extrinsic evidence is to be admitted. Fundamental 
fairness requires that both sides be allowed to offer parol 
evidence if either is. That was not the case in the trial below. 
A. MIS-STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At page 13 of Ms. Jones' brief, the first full paragraph on 
that page, Ms. Jones asserts that Defendant Gloria Baldwin 
"voiced no objection to the new agreement". The record citation 
for that proposition does not support the proposition. At 
transcript page 338 (record page 94 6) Mrs. Baldwin is being 
examined by Plaintiff's attorney. In the course of that 
examination and subsequent cross-examination by her own attorney, 
Mrs. Baldwin states and then re-states that she did communicate 
to the Plaintiff that she objected to the new agreement. While 
Mrs. Baldwin is less than clear on the timing of those objections 
and whether there was one such statement of objections or many, 
it is definitely not clear that she voiced no objection. Just 
the opposite is true. (Tr. 338-341, R. 946-949). 
The other major mis-step in Plaintiff's "statement of the 
case" section is the statement in the second paragraph on page 14 
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which is: 
The trial court found that the 1992 agreement was 
an extension or modification of the 1984 agreement and 
that the terms of the prior agreement carried forward, 
and that Ms. Jones was therefore entitled to apply her 
equity credit against the purchase price of the 
property. 
That statement is a fair re-statement of the cited source, 
but demonstrates one of the fundamental problems with the 
decision below, i.e., it is internally inconsistent. If the 
19921 agreement is an extension and modification of the 1984 
That agreement reeds as follows: 
AGREEMENT 
This agreement made & entered into this 1st day of Aug. 1992 by 
and between David Baldwin hereinafter referred to as the "grantor" and 
Ada Jones, hereinafter referred to as the "grantee" witnesseth. 
That the grantor hereby grants the use of to grantee certain 
restaurant (or cafe1) and motel (or gift shop) property located in 
Boulder Utah, Garfield County, State of Utah, upon the following terms 
& conditions 
1. The term of this agreement shall be the first day to the last 
day of each month, with rent due by the first day of each month. 
Grantor covenants and warrants that he has full right & authority to 
enter into this agreement. 
2. During the term of this agreement, the rent to be paid by the 
grantee shall be the sum of $400.00. Thereafter, the amount shall be 
subject to re-negotiation among the parties, and with a 15 day grace 
period on rent payment. 
*3. At any time during this agreement the grantee may have the 
first right of refusal to purchase said property. 
A. The purchase price shall be fixed, at that // time, at a fair 
market value, as established by the opinions of three (3) independent 
appraisers, to be selected by mutual agreement of the parties hereto. 
B. The remaining terms of such purchase shall be established at 
that time by mutual agreement of the parties hereto. 
4. In addition to the rental specified herein, grantee agrees to 
pay all utilities and water charges, and shall be entitled to the use 
of the commercial water connection to the property. 
5. Grantee shall be entitled to make improvement upon the 
premises and property, and agree to maintain them in good repair and 
order, with prior approval from Grantor. 
6. Grantor shall pay the real property taxes upon the premises & 
property. 
7. Grantee shall retain and keep in force at all times adequate 
insurance necessary to protect their interest upon said premises. 
8. If grantee should desire to subgrant at any time it must be 
with prior approval of grantor in writing. 
9. At reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, grantor shall 
be entitled to inspect the premises, and to perform necessary repairs 
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agreement, then the judgment below cannot stand. The 1992 
agreement expressly replaces the option language of that earlier 
agreement with a "first right of refusal". The 1984 agreement, 
standing by itself, provided for a pure option with a price 
determination by independent appraisers but with a minimum and 
maximum price range. The corresponding terms of the 1992 
agreement specifically exclude any option language as well as the 
minimum and maximum price ranges. If the 1992 agreement extends 
and modifies the 1984 agreement, the only principled reading of 
the consolidated agreement is the option has been removed and 
// and maintenance thereon. 
10. In the event of default under the terms of this grant, 
grantor reserves the right, after due notice of such default, to 
terminate this grant; to re-enter and take possession of the premises; 
and to re-let the same, and apply the proceeds thereof to the 
obligation of the grantee hereunder. In that event the grantee agrees 
to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises, and to restore them 
to a good or better condition as when they took possession thereof, 
normal wear and tear expected. 
11. If either party hereto, for good cause, desires to terminate 
this grant, they must provide written notice in due time prior to the 
date of such proposed termination. 
12. Grantee agrees to comply with all applicable federal, state, 
and local laws and ordinances. 
13. If legal action is taken to enforce the terms of this 
agreement, the defaulting party shall pay all costs incurred in 
connection with such action, including reasonable attorney1s fees. 
14. This agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
parties, and may only be // modified, in writting, signed by both 
parties. 
15. This agreement shall be binding upon, and shall inure to the 
benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective heirs, legal 
representatives, successors, and assigns. 
Dated this 12th day of Aug. 1992. 
Grantor Grantee 
Continuation of #1 above, this agreement shall continue in effect 
for one year, renewable at that time for one year terms up to five 
years, as long as everything is current and agreed to by both parties. 
Grantor agrees to maintain adequate insurance on premises. 
(Notary) Grantor 
David Baldwin 
Grantee 
Ada A. Jones 
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that the retention of the appraiser language is made as a safety 
check, for Plaintiff's benefit, on the bona fides of the offer 
which Baldwins might be willing to accept. The decision below 
and Plaintiff!s argument require that the amendment in 1992 
govern with respect to the deletion of the price range but the 
original 1984 agreement govern with respect to whether an option 
or a right of first refusal is being offered. The only 
"principle" that can explain such ala carte selection of terms is 
the principle of advance determination of which party should win. 
Such a decision is not sustainable in law or equity. 
Another reason why the court's finding and conclusion no. 7 
mandates reversal is that it contradicts the express terms of 
Exhibit 2, the 1992 agreement. The 1992 agreement is 
unquestionably the later of the two. Paragraph 14 of that 
agreement says "This agreement contains the entire agreement 
between the parties and may only be modified, in writing, signed 
by both parties." That integration clause has to be completely 
ignored in order to allow the result below to stand. Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720 (Utah 1990) at page 725 states: 
"The basic rule of contract interpretation 
is that the intent of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the content of the instrument 
itself. . . . Each contract provision is to be 
considered in relation to all of the others, 
with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 63 6 P.2d 
1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 
P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). The plain meaning 
rule preserves the intent of the parties and 
protects the contract against judicial revision. 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 
749 (Utah 1982); Utah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061. 
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[4] [5] Parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of a contract 
which is clear on its face. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). But if a 
contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to 
explain the parties1 intent. Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 
1986); Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. Whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law which 
must be decided before parol evidence is 
admitted. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 12 93. "[A] motion 
for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal 
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the 
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the 
parties intended." Id. 
[6] [7] When ambiguity does exist, the intent 
of the parties is a question of fact to be 
determined by the jury. Colonial Leasing Co., 731 
P. 2d at 488. Failure to resolve an ambiguity by 
determining the partiesf intent from parol 
evidence is error. Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 5 90 
P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1979). If a contract is 
ambiguous, the court may consider the parties1 actions 
and performance as evidence of the parties1 true 
intention. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 
(Utah 1975); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 
2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972); Bullough v. 
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 309, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (1965). 
[8] The trial court held the royalty provision 
ambiguous because the amount due was "based on several 
factors not immediately capable of definitive 
determination." However, a contract provision is 
not necessarily ambiguous just because one party 
gives that provision a different meaning than 
another party does. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). To 
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of 
the parties must each be tenable. See, e.g., 
Grow v. Marwick Dev., Inc., 621 P. 2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 
1980). Even if a provision is not "immediately 
capable of definitive determination," that does not 
necessarily make the provision unenforceable. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The decision below has violated every one of those 
principles of contract interpretation. The 1992 agreement 
expressly states that it is an integration. That provision was 
ignored in order to add arbitrarily selected terms from the 1984 
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agreement. Instead of construing the provisions related to sale 
in the 1992 agreement in a way which gives meaning to all terms, 
i.e., that it is a right of first refusal with appraisers 
available as a reality check on the bona fides of any offers 
proposed to be accepted, the court adopted an interpretation 
which makes portions of the sale related clauses meaningless and 
also requires other sections of the contract to be ignored. 
Instead of determining whether or not the contract was 
ambiguous before deciding to admit parol evidence, the court 
below allowed the Plaintiff to testify what she believed the 
contract meant and then determined the contract was ambiguous in 
order to tailor a result to that testimony. If an ambiguity did 
exist, instead of allowing the intent of the parties to be 
determined by the jury, the court below made all the 
determinations as to the intent of the parties and allowed only a 
partial question of damages to be determined by the jury. 
In addition, the court's determination of ambiguity is 
itself legally erroneous because there are not two reasonable 
interpretations. The 1992 right of refusal provision, standing 
by itself, is clear and unequivocal, is capable of ready 
enforcement, and is not missing any essential terms. While 
Baldwins1 interpretation gives meaning to every term of the 1992 
agreement, both Mr. Jones' and the court's interpretation require 
that portions of the later agreement be ignored and the portions 
of a prior agreement supersede corresponding portions of the 
later agreement. Such an arbitrary construction of contracts is 
untenable and unreasonable. 
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E^ REJECTION OF THE RULES OF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION IS A FQRTIQRI AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
As is discussed above, Plaintiff1s attempt to increase the 
standard of review in this case is both a departure from what was 
actually appealed in this matter and unwarranted by the law. As 
in the case of Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) 
the case below involved an equitable remedy but that equitable 
remedy was given as a result of erroneous contract 
interpretation, which is a matter of law. As the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[1] [2] We decide as we do herein in awareness 
that, inasmuch as specific performance is an equitable 
remedy, the trial judge has considerable discretion in 
determining whether equity and good conscience require 
that the relief be granted. (FN2) But it is equally 
true that when the trial court has based his ruling 
upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, 
where a correct one may have produced a different 
result, the party adversely affected thereby is 
entitled to have the error rectified and a proper 
adjudication under correct principles of law. 
(Citations omitted.) 
The trial in the court below was not a full trial on the 
merits as framed in the Complaint. Judge Tibbs! order granting 
partial summary judgment to Ms. Jones made a number of findings 
that foreclosed large areas of proof and argument to the 
Baldwins. Finding no. 2 of that order erroneously interpreted 
the contract. Finding no. 4 of that order erroneously determined 
a pricing scheme based upon the previous error. Finding no. 7 
foreclosed issues with respect to the property boundaries based 
upon the previous two errors. Only findings 8 through 11, 
dealing with definiteness of value, method of conveyance, 
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environmental encumbrances and water rights were left open for 
trial. Those were all matters which the court expressly stated in 
its order were not expressly part of the contract and which 
therefore could only be addressed by extrinsic parol evidence. 
The court having therefore ordered that only parol evidence would 
be heard prior to present counsel becoming involved in the case, 
the case was lost to Baldwins before the trial began. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 
(Utah 1957) states the sequence of steps which should be 
undertaken by a court in determining the meaning of the contract. 
The court below violated each of those rules starting with the 
decision on summary judgment. Nevertheless, even if it had been 
proper to admit parol evidence regarding the four terms that the 
court was willing to have a trial on, the court's decision was 
demonstrably incorrect as a matter of law. As Justice Howe of 
the Utah Supreme Court stated in his dissenting opinion to 
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Utah 1982) parol evidence 
is admissible to apply, not to supply, a description of lands in 
the contract: 
Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of 
identifying the description contained in the writing 
with its location upon the ground, but not for the 
purpose of ascertaining and locating the land about 
which the parties negotiated, and supplying a 
description thereof which they had omitted from the 
writing. There is a clear distinction between the 
admission of oral and extrinsic evidence for the 
purpose of identifying the land described and applying 
the description to the property and that of supplying 
and adding to a description insufficient and void on 
its face. 
The above is merely a particular formulation of the hornbook 
law principle that parol evidence, when admissible, is admissible 
11 
only to explain and not to alter or amend the terms of the 
contract. The decision below, both in the summary judgment order 
and by the terms of the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
implying a "reasonable" price, a "reasonable" environmental rule, 
a "reasonable" water distribution, and a "reasonable" property 
description, evidence that terms were being added to the 
contract, not merely explained. As is mentioned in Baldwins1 
prior brief, the Plaintiff expressly stated that none of those 
terms had even been discussed between the parties prior to the 
"tender" that gave rise to this litigation. The fact the terms 
with respect to water, environmental issues, boundaries, and 
price were absent from the 1992 agreement is consistent with the 
right of first refusal. A right of first refusal provides a 
party with the opportunity to purchase property upon exactly the 
same terms and conditions as a seller would be willing to sell to 
others for. In other words, all the terms that were "missing" 
from the 1992 agreement would have been supplied by the offer 
which was subject to the right of first refusal. This is yet 
another example of how the court below ignored the interpretation 
which made the contract at issue complete and sensible, 
preferring an interpretation which required a contract to be 
created from scratch by the court. 
The court's determination with respect to environmental 
issues is directly contradictory to paragraph 12 of the 1992 
agreement. That paragraph states "Grantee [Ms. Jones] agrees to 
comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and 
ordinances." That provision places the burden of compliance with 
12 
environmental laws upon Ms. Jones. Nonetheless, because the 
court was creating an agreement from scratch, that provision was 
ignored in the court's decision. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the "missing terms of the 
contract were not supplied by legal presumptions, established 
customs, other rules of law, and evidence of the conduct of the 
parties,11 they were established by arbitrary fiat. 
£L TURNING A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL INTO AN OPTION 
VIOLATES EVERY PRINCIPLE OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION. 
The first rule of contract interpretation is the document 
should be checked internally to determine if it is consistent and 
makes sense. There has been no showing below or in Plaintiff's 
appeal brief, that the 1992 agreement is internally inconsistent 
and irreconcilable. Until such a showing is made, the court may 
not look at extrinsic evidence at all. As is discussed above, 
the 1992 agreement can be interpreted within the four corners as 
internally consistent in giving meaning to all terms. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 
1957) specifically states "If the ambiguity can be reconciled 
from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic 
evidence should not be allowed." (Citations omitted) 
In other words, if the contract itself can be construed 
consistently and without omitting any of its terms in only one 
reasonable fashion, then the court may not go outside the 
contract. If there are two such reasonable interpretations if 
the preferred interpretation can be determined from within the 
contract itself, the court may still not go outside the contract. 
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It is only when there are two interpretations which both give 
effect to all parts of the contract and where there is nothing in 
the contract itself which would allow the court to determine a 
preference for those two reasonable interpretations that terms 
outside the document itself may be examined. The court below 
skipped over those rules. 
Even if the court had been justified in going outside the 
1992 contract, the court was not justified in determining that 
the contract offered an option. Property Assistance Corp. v. 
Roberts, 768 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1989), quoting Restatement 
2d of Contracts §25 (1981), states: 
An option contract is fa promise which meets the 
requirement for formation of a contract and limits the 
promisor's power to revoke an offer1 ... two element 
exist in such a contract: (1) an offer of sell, which 
does not become a contract until accepted; and (2) a 
contract to leave the offer open for a specified time. 
..." (citations omitted) 
There is no showing that any offer to sell was required to 
be left open for a specified time. In fact, Baldwins attempted 
to introduce evidence that they had taken steps to terminate the 
contract for default in accordance with this provision. Baldwins 
were prevented from having that evidence admitted. (See e.g., Tr. 
568, R. 1149.) 
In its argument that this court should look beyond the 
"label" of right of first refusal to the substance, it is 
interesting to note that all of the cases cited by Plaintiff hold 
that an "option" so designated is, in each cited case, actually a 
right of first refusal. It is much less invasive to require a 
party to sell property to a particular party but upon terms which 
14 
are acceptable to the seller, as is required with a right of 
first refusal, than is an option whereby a party may force the 
sale of the seller's property at any time. Plaintiff has cited 
neither fact nor law to support the imposition of an option in 
violation of the express provisions of the 1992 contract. 
The sole support for Plaintiff's argument that an option was 
intended is their assertion that a mechanism for determining 
price is not needed with a right of first refusal. While it is 
true that such a mechanism is not essential to a right of first 
refusal, it was suggested by Baldwins that provision serves as a 
safety valve to allow Ms. Jones to reform a "reality check" on 
any offer. Similarly, paragraph 3(b) of the 1992 agreement which 
states, "The remaining terms of such purchase shall be 
established at that time by mutual agreement of the parties 
hereto" constitutes a safety valve for applying terms which may 
not be included in an offer. For example, some third party might 
have offered the Baldwins $320,000.00 for all of their property 
but not specified a payment term. Assuming that offer was 
acceptable to Baldwins, they would have to give a right of first 
refusal to Ms. Jones upon all the specified terms. Terms of 
payment being an incidental term unspecified in the original 
offer, it would be susceptible to negotiation between the 
Baldwins and Ms. Jones. If Ms. Jones believed that the 
$320,000.00 offer was a straw man offer proposed as a sham by the 
Baldwins, she could, under the terms of the 1992 agreement, 
request a check on valuation by three appraisers. The above 
hypothetical demonstrates at least one interpretation which gives 
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meaning to all of the terms at issue and therefore prevents the 
acceptance of Plaintiff's argument. 
On the other hand, if paragraph 3(a) and (b) of the 1992 
agreement are interpreted to be an option, then paragraph 3 (b) 
states that all of the terms except price must be subsequently 
agreed to. Therefore, the agreement is merely an agreement to 
agree and cannot survive as an enforceable option. 
EL THE PRICE ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT WAS 
ARBITRARILY LOW. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 
139, 478 P.2d 327, 330 (Utah 1970) for the proposition that the 
requirement for definite terms exist to do justice not to 
"perpetrate an injustice.11 The only definite term on price that 
had ever been discussed and agreed to between the parties was the 
statement in the 1984 contract that the minimum purchase value of 
the property would be $70,000.00. Even though the 1984 agreement 
contains a similar provision regarding appointment of three 
appraisers, the court below was willing to bring forward the 
option language but not the price language from that contract. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the 1992 contract was not an integration 
and was intended only to modify the 1984 agreement, there is 
nothing in the 1992 agreement which indicates any desire to 
eliminate the price range specified. The court below has 
arbitrarily substituted the indefinite term of valuation by 
appraisers for the definite term of valuation by appraisers 
within a range. By removing the price floor which protected the 
Baldwins and then placing liability for environmental concerns 
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upon the Baldwins, giving Plaintiff credit for rent paid toward 
the unwanted sale, awarding damages and attorney's fees, the 
court below has not only confiscated the Baldwin's property, they 
are making Baldwins pay to give it away. To assert that the 
Baldwins are the workers of injustice in that situation is an 
Orwellian mis-statement. 
£L THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY CONTEMPLATES 
ONLY BUILDINGS r NOT THE SPRRQVNPING REALTY
 r 
Plaintiff has cited numerous cases where a sales contract 
referring to an address or to a farm or to some other readily 
identifiable parcel of land was allowed to be enhanced to a meets 
and bounds or other legal description. Each of those cases 
involved situations where there was no dispute about whether 
there had been an agreement for sale of property and only 
subsidiary issues, none material, were involved. Even then, 
however, the decisions were not without controversy as evidenced 
by the dissenting opinions generated in those cases. 
Nonetheless, the agreement at issue here does not fit the mold of 
those cases. Here the property is described merely as !l [A] 
certain restaurant (or cafe) and motel (or gift shop) property 
located in Boulder, Utah ...". The 1984 agreement refers only to 
"certain restaurant and service station property located in 
Boulder ..." . As is shown by Exhibit 11, the buildings, which are 
the referenced description, encompass only the small part of the 
entire parcel of property. Furthermore, a large portion of the 
property which is not covered by the buildings is behind the 
operating area of the two buildings and therefore not essential 
1 1 
to their use. In light of that, it is at least questionable, 
particularly in light of the testimony of the Baldwins that they 
used the unused portion of the property for ingress and egress 
from their home, whether or not all of the parcel was covered by 
the lease. 
Here again this is an ambiguity that exists only if the 1992 
contract is construed as Plaintiff desires. If construed 
according to its express terms a right of first refusal, the 
extent of the property to be sold would be covered by the terms 
of any offer which was otherwise acceptable to Baldwins. 
JL PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT ON GLORIA BALDWIN'S ABSENCE 
FROM THE CONTRACT DEPENDS UPON A MIS-STATEMENT, 
The basis of Plaintiff's argument that David Baldwin could 
have honored the contract as an agent for Gloria Baldwin depends 
on their assertion of fact which is incorrect. Mrs. Baldwin 
testified that she expressly informed Ms. Jones on at least one, 
if not several occasions, that she was opposed to the agreement. 
A principal may not be bound by the acts of an agent where the 
party seeking to rely on the agency relationship is aware that 
the agent is acting outside the scope of his authority. 
G, ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT "LIENS OR 
ENCUMBRANCES" , 
Ms. Jones asserts that is was proper to force the Baldwins 
to absorb the cost of environmental compliance in order to get 
"good and marketable title." The definition of good and 
marketable title supplied by Plaintiff!s brief includes only 
adverse claims of ownership. The requirement for environmental 
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abatement is merely a cost which is associated with the property. 
Violation of environmental laws does not result in forfeiture of 
the property ownership, it merely results in the imposition of 
fines. Because environmental concerns do not constitute an 
adverse claim of ownership, they do not hinder good and 
marketable title. The fact that it might be difficult to find 
someone willing to pay money to acquire an environmental 
liability does not in any way affect the chain of title. 
IL PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT ADMITS THAT THE COURT TS 
ORDER ON WATER CONSTITUTES A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY. 
Plaintiff's brief acknowledged that the water district 
testified that there was no provision in place for splitting a 
water share. Plaintiff merely argues that because such a 
provision may come into existence in the future that the court 
was justified in ordering something which does not exist now. 
Ordering the present delivery of something which does not now 
exist but which only might exist in the future is, by definition, 
a legal impossibility. 
Plaintiff has also cited Utah Code Annotated §73-1-11 to the 
effect that apurtenant water goes with the land unless it is 
reserved. If the 1992 contract is an option then a problem is 
created since the water was apurtenant to both the residential 
property and the commercial buildings. If the 1992 contract was, 
as stated, a right of first refusal, then the disposition of the 
water right would be covered in the terms of the offer to be 
accepted. Here again the decision of the court below creates 
problems and ambiguities which are not a part of the contract as 
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drafted. 
L PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT ON DAMAGES CONFUSES 
APPLICABLE WITH INAPPLICABLE LAW. 
As is stated in Baldwins1 initial brief, damages are not 
available in an equitable case because of the definitions of 
money damages and equitable relief. Plaintiff's citations of 
cases on election of remedies are therefore inapposite. 
Nonetheless, even if damages are conceptually available for delay 
in providing an equitable remedy, they should not be available in 
this case because the court did not consider any offset for 
interest retained on funds as required by Eliason v. Watts, 615 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1980) and because the lower court prevented 
Baldwins from admitting evidence regarding default of Ms. Jones 
that would have shown that the contract was terminated and that 
therefore she was not entitled to any equitable remedy. The 
court also precluded the introduction of evidence regarding 
quantum of those damages from the Baldwins. 
U L CONCLUSION ANP RELIEF SOUGHT 
The result below started down the wrong road both legally 
and equitably when Judge Mower was replaced and his decision on 
summary judgment was reversed. That decision was based on a 
legally wrong interpretation of contract and legally wrong 
implications of terms and legally wrong determinations to admit 
parol evidence. All of those legal errors were consistently 
applied and compounded throughout the trial to the disadvantage 
of the Baldwins. Although Plaintiff's counsel has been artful in 
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attempting to couch both the findings and the conclusions in 
terms of equity, to shield this injustice from appellate review, 
the decision below is internally contradictory and contravenes 
every established rule of contract interpretation. This contract 
cannot be both ambiguous and unambiguous. If it is unambiguous, 
there is no basis for mixing and matching terms from the 1984 
contract. If it is ambiguous, then both sides should be allowed 
to introduce parol evidence on the issues and the jury should 
have been allowed to find the intention of the parties. Whether 
it is ambiguous or unambiguous, no court is ever justified in 
arbitrarily ignoring contract clauses like the integration clause 
and the 'compliance with law' clause of the 1992 agreement. 
The decision below represents both bad law and inequity and 
must be reversed.1 
xIn one of Plaintiff's footnotes they assert that 
Judge Tibbs has been personally attacked in the prior 
brief. As a result of that assertion, we have re-read 
that brief and do not believe that any such personal 
attacks occur, although Judge Tibbs is mentioned as 
being the author of the bad decision below. The 
undersigned counsel have nothing but the highest 
personal regard for Judge Tibbs and specifically 
believes that Judge Tibbs is a fine human being. We 
further have nothing but respect for his judicial 
office. Nonetheless, we can see no way to justify his 
decision based on principles of law and therefore must 
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The court below was requested to grant summary judgment for 
the Baldwins and would have been justified in doing so. The 
court below received a motion for dismissal under Rule 41(b) at 
the appropriate time in the case. That motion was similarly 
justified. In light of the fact that Plaintiff's position is 
untenable as a matter of law, this court is justified, and is 
hereby requested to reverse the decision below and enter judgment 
in favor of the Baldwins dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with 
prejudice and awarding Baldwins' costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to paragraph 13 of the 1992 agreement. 
DATED this?>C) * day of February, 1997. 
Appellants 
TIMOTHY MI^DEIT-WHrLARDSaN, for: 
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE 
Attorneys for Defendants-
vigorously oppose it 
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